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2023 ANNUAL REPORT

OF

THE COUNCIL FOR THE OVERSIGHT

OF THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF THE

PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC (CFSIRP)

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1. Introduction

The overall mission of the Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (CFSIRP) is to monitor the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic, without prejudice to the supervisory powers of the Assembly of the Republic under constitutional terms (Article 8, paragraph 1, of the SIRP Framework Law - Law no. 30/84, of 5 September, in its current wording). Its general mission is to monitor and supervise the 'activity of the Secretary-General and the intelligence services, ensuring compliance with the Constitution and the law, with a particular focus on the preservation of rights, freedoms and guarantees' (Article 9, paragraph 1, of the SIRP Framework Law). Under the terms of Article 34, paragraph 2, of the SIRP Framework Law, this supervisory and monitoring power also covers the intelligence production activities of the Armed Forces, which are the responsibility of the Military Intelligence and Security Centre (CISMIL).

The CFSIRP has a legal duty to account for its activities to the Assembly of the Republic and, more specifically, under the terms of Article 9, paragraph 2(j), of the SIRP Framework Law, to issue and submit to it 'reports at least every six months on the functioning of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic'. Under these terms, the CFSIRP is presenting the Assembly of the Republic with its Report for 2023.

It should be emphasised that the Intelligence Services play an irreplaceable role in the timely detection of threats to the Country, which must be taken with the utmost seriousness as a condition for preserving our freedom and autonomy in a democratic State based on the Rule of Law.

Under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the SIRP Framework Law, 'the intelligence services are responsible for ensuring the production of information necessary for the preservation of internal and external security, as well as national independence and interests and the unity and integrity of the State.' This legal mission positively delimits their competences.

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In 2023, the work of the Intelligence Services was marked by the challenges posed by the War in Ukraine, which gave centre stage to counter-espionage activities, as well as detecting, preventing and combating cyberthreats and cybercrime. The World Youth Day also mobilised the concerns of the Intelligence Services, which are also responsible for carrying out threat/security assessments.

Considering that the CFSIRP Report is of a public and unclassified nature, the information it contains is consistent with that nature.

2. Nature, mission and activity of the Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic

The CFSIRP's mission is to ensure that the SIRP acts in compliance with the Constitution, the law and citizens' rights, freedoms and guarantees, respecting the priorities determined by the Superior Intelligence Council. On the other hand, it is also responsible for ensuring that the SIRP acts effectively in order to guarantee its mission of preserving internal and external security, independence, national interests and the unity and integrity of Portugal.

The activity of the SIRP and the CISMIL is monitored through regular meetings with the heads of all levels of the hierarchy of the bodies and services that make them up, starting with the Secretary-General and the heads of the Intelligence Services and Common Structures. In particular, it endeavours to go through the entire structure in order to guarantee affirmative action.

The CFSIRP is concerned with monitoring the Intelligence Services through inspection visits to their own premises. Some meetings are based on the documentation that the CFSIRP receives and allow it to delve deeper into certain matters and assess whether the legally established objectives and priorities are being met. In its mission, the CFSIRP seeks access to the entire operating procedure of the Intelligence Services and to know how they operate, what information they produce, how they use the information produced, what resources they have, how they preserve the security of information, how they process data or how they recruit, train and manage human resources.

Part of the CFSIRP's activity is also based on analysing documents. The CFSIRP receives and analyses the reports on the activities of the Intelligence Services, including the CISMIL, and the documentation from the Secretary-General of the SIRP, with emphasis on the list of ongoing processes and the monthly analysis of the reports produced, and can access the intelligence reports produced by the Intelligence Services. Based on this documentation, the CFSIRP requests the

4. Activities in 2023

3.1. Secretary-General of the SIRP, Common Structures and Data Centres

The duties and responsibilities of the Secretary-General of the SIRP are set out in Article 19, paragraph 3, of the SIRP Framework Law and include inspecting and overseeing the Intelligence Services (SIED and SIS), leading and coordinating the Intelligence Services and managing the SIED and the SIS Common Structures and Data Centres.

The CFSIRP monitored the actions of the Secretary-General and carried out direct, unmediated supervision of the Intelligence Services, including the Common Structures.

In addition to analysing all the documents received, as well as frequent contacts maintained, in 2023, the CFSIRP held 3 (three) meetings with the Secretary-General of the SIRP. At these meetings, it also sought to obtain the necessary clarifications on the matters covered in the documentation received or on information involving the activity of the Intelligence Services. The functioning of the Intelligence Services was also discussed in its different aspects, with special emphasis on human resources, international cooperation, coordination with the security forces and services and the authorities responsible for criminal investigation, the technological means necessary for the proper performance of missions, financial resources and facilities.

Special mention should be made of the renewal of the SIRP's technological infrastructure (SIRP Digital Transformation Programme/Integrated Information System), with the aim of redesigning the SIED and the SIS operating processes, improving and making information processing and coordination with the Data Centres more effective and transparent. During 2023, the CFSIRP met twice with the head and staff of the Joint Department of Information Technology to find out about the implementation status of this Programme. Presently, the system has already been implemented. This modernisation of the SIRP's information and

cohesion and dedication of its human resources, crucial conditions for the continued effective and competent fulfilment of its essential mission.

However, the CFSIRP cannot fail to highlight the urgent need to guarantee the annual recruitment of human resources, in order to, at least, make up for the shortfall resulting from the retirement of a significant number of officials. It therefore suggests that the competent authorities pay special attention to this issue, in order to ensure that the Intelligence Services are operational.

Bearing in mind the importance of budgetary issues, as well as those relating to the equipment and infrastructure of the Intelligence Services, the CFSIRP made an inspection visit to the Joint Department of Finance, Administration and Support.

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clarifications it needs to carry out its inspection mission, thus knowing how the Intelligence Services carry out their activities.

During 2023, the CFSIRP fully exercised the legal competences set out in Article 9, paragraph 2 and 3, of the SIRP Framework Law.

In this context, the CFSIRP held meetings with the Secretary-General of the SIRP, as well as with the heads and officials of the Intelligence Services (including the regional directorates) that are part of the SIRP, with inspection visits to their premises or by convening meetings on their own premises. As a rule, the inspection visits are not preceded by an indication of the issues to be dealt with and are aimed at going more in-depth into matters arising from the documentation received, assessing compliance with the objectives and priorities established by law or arising from the directives of the Superior Intelligence Council, as well as monitoring the Intelligence Services in their organisation and human dimension, in the matters they deal with and in the way they act to achieve the objectives legally assigned to them. The CFSIRP has received full cooperation from managers and officials in its requests, and has not detected any obstacles to its intervention.

The CFSIRP carries out its control and monitoring activities discreetly, firmly and persistently, endeavouring not to jeopardise the efficiency and effectiveness of the Intelligence Services and their important mission.

In accordance with Article 9, paragraph 2(m), of the SIRP Framework Law, the CFSIRP must keep 'a classified, up-to-date and exhaustive record of its control and inspection activities'. During 2023, 49 minutes of the activities carried out by the CFSIRP were approved.

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3.2. Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED)

Under the terms of Article 20 of the SIRP Framework Law, the Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) is responsible for producing and analysing information generated abroad that 'contributes to safeguard national independence, national interests and the external security of the Portuguese State'.

This mission takes the form of permanent analysis and monitoring of political, social, economic and security events taking place abroad, which can influence decision-making by national authorities, detecting risk situations and potential threats as early as possible. The SIED's *modus operandi* is determined by its characteristics as an external intelligence service, which justifies its operational aspect and the deepening of its articulated action with the Armed Forces, within the scope of the latter's external missions.

The SIED is also a relevant partner for the Portuguese state's international cooperation, particularly in specific locations where it has a deep level of knowledge, promoting analyses of the internal situations of various countries that are of interest to the Country, in addition to thematic analyses that are relevant to national interests.

In 2023, its activity was very much determined by the war in Ukraine, without neglecting its other geographical and thematic priorities. Despite the need to reinforce human and material resources, given the wide geographical and thematic area to which its competences relate, the SIED maintained a high level of document production with remarkable quality for the transmission of information necessary to safeguard national interests. This good performance is largely due to the fact that it has human resources who, as a rule, demonstrate a high standard of knowledge and working methods and ethical awareness, as well as an internalisation of the regulatory framework for information research, processing and dissemination activities.

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communication system guarantees greater efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of the Intelligence Services, allowing for better procedures for collecting and processing information, better coordination between the Services' document management systems and the respective Data Centres, as well as greater transparency, also to the benefit of inspection actions.

At the same time, along with the irreplaceable HUMINT (Human Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) and the access to Internet data are becoming more and more relevant and are an increasingly central tool in the production of similar Intelligence Services. Thus, in its work, the CFSIRP has therefore emphasised the importance of reinforcing investment in new technologies in order to make the fulfilment of the Portuguese Intelligence Services' mission more effective, for which OSINT (research and production of information based on open sources) assumes increasing centrality in the digital age. It is therefore a concern of the intelligence community to equip itself with the most modern and sophisticated technological systems to facilitate access to available information and manage knowledge, particularly relevant in the areas of counter-terrorism. In the CFSIRP's opinion, this should be a priority for the Secretary-General of the SIRP and the competent authorities in future budget years.

In 2023, the CFSIRP paid particular attention to the issue of human resources. The good performance of the Intelligence Services depends to a large extent on the existence of sufficient, competent, motivated and ethical human resources. Therefore, in 2023, the CFSIRP monitored the recruitment, training and internship process of the Intelligence Technicians who were hired, and took part in a training course. It also made an inspection visit to the Joint Department of Human Resources, meeting with various officials and analysing recruitment files.

In this regard, the CFSIRP was pleased to see that the concerns expressed in its Reports for 2022 and the first half of 2023 were addressed, with the approval, at the end of 2023, of the legislation that revised the special careers of the SIRP corps. The CFSIRP hopes that this review of careers will help to maintain the

In 2023, in addition to analysing the documents received, the CFSIRP carried out 6 (six) inspection visits to the SIED.

The visits were carried out without a pre-determined agenda or topic to be covered, and made it possible to analyse files, reports and various documents requested at random, according to criteria previously defined by the CFSIRP. Special attention was paid to operational activity.

In 2023, as observed by the CFSIRP, the SIED acted within the priorities determined by higher authorities and in compliance with the legal framework governing its actions.

The CFSIRP experienced no difficulties in carrying out its monitoring and inspection duties of the SIED, accessing the information requested and obtaining all the clarifications required.

3.3. Security Intelligence Service (SIS)

Under the terms of Article 21 of the SIRP Framework Law, the mission of the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) is to 'produce information that contributes to the safeguarding of internal security and the prevention of sabotage, terrorism, espionage and the practice of acts that, by their nature, may alter or destroy the constitutionally established Rule of Law'. On the other hand, under the terms of Article 25 of the Internal Security Law, the SIS carries out internal security functions, which, under the terms of Article 2, is 'the activity carried out by the State to guarantee public order, security and tranquillity, and to prevent and repress crime'. And under the terms of the SEGNAC (Instructions for National Security, Safeguard and Defence of Classified Matters), the SIS cooperates with the GNS (National Security Office), in the area of the security of classified State documents.

The SIS's activity of 'information production' is a complex process that necessarily involves a multitude of operational activities to collect, research, analyse and disseminate information on the phenomena that the SIS is tasked with preventing.

Crucial in the so-called information production cycle is the activity of searching for news or facts relevant to its mission, reported by any person or by the Security Forces and Services, under the terms of Article 10, paragraph 4, of the SIRP Framework Law. In accordance with Article 32, paragraph 3, of the SIRP Framework Law, the SIS must communicate to the competent authorities not only information, but also evidence regarding facts that indicate the commission of offences against State security.

In addition to producing intelligence reports in the thematic areas assigned to it by law, the SIS carries out other very important missions, such as producing threat assessments, security accreditations and developing programmes to open up to civil society, such as raising awareness of the protection of critical infrastructures, the country's economic security and the protection of strategic

knowledge. In addition, the SIS participates in coordination structures within the Internal Security System, as well as in the most varied instances of international cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, which is essential for providing and obtaining the appropriate information needed to fulfil its mission.

In 2023, the SIS's activity was influenced by the World Youth Day, which led to an increase in its activity.

It was also marked by the controversy surrounding the episode in which the Head of Cabinet of the Minister of Infrastructure reported the theft of a laptop containing classified State documents, taken from the Ministry by an assistant who had just been dismissed. The facts and the legal framework of the SIS's activities were explained in detail and in a reasoned manner at two hearings in the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees, which took place on 9 May and 21 June 2023, behind closed doors, in accordance with the law.

During 2023, in addition to analysing the documents received and other meetings and contacts, the CFSIRP carried out 7 (seven) inspection visits to the SIS, including its Regional Directorates in the Algarve and Porto.

The visits were carried out without a pre-determined agenda or topic to be addressed, and made it possible to analyse files, reports and various documents requested at random, according to criteria previously defined by CFSIRP. Special attention was paid to the *modus operandi* of operational activity.

In 2023, as observed by the CFSIRP, the SIS acted within the priorities determined by higher authorities and in compliance with the legal framework governing its actions.

The CFSIRP did not experience any difficulties in carrying out its monitoring and oversight of the SIS, accessing the information requested and obtaining all the clarifications required.

3.4. Military Intelligence and Security Centre (CISMIL)

As part of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMGFA), the CISMIL is the military intelligence and security body with the mission of ensuring 'the production of information necessary to fulfil the missions of the Armed Forces and guarantee military security' (Article 10 of Organic Law no. 2/2021, of August 9 - Organic Law on the Organisation of the Armed Forces/LOBOFA).

Focussed on producing operational and tactical information for the Armed Forces, the CISMIL's duties include producing strategic military, operational and tactical information and supporting the preparation and execution of military missions, as well as ensuring that the Armed Forces liaise with the SIRP's intelligence services.

Although military intelligence is not an integral part of the SIRP, under the terms of Article 34, paragraph 2, of the SIRP Framework Law, the CFSIRP and the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission have powers to monitor and supervise the CISMIL's activities.

According to Article 43 of the EMGFA's Organic Law, the CISMIL is headed by a commodore or brigadier general. It should be noted that, in practice, there has been a high turnover in the leadership. In fact, in 2023, the CFSIRP met with two CISMIL directors. Without prejudice to providing the CISMIL with stable and competent human resources to produce qualitatively important information for operational support of military missions, the stability of the leadership is essential for the functioning and creation of its own culture, as well as for strengthening its operational capabilities, avoiding possible and undesirable overlaps in operational actions between the CISMIL and the SIED and, above all, in terms of counterintelligence and hybrid threats, between the CISMIL and the SIS. For this reason, the CFSIRP has already expressed its concern to the former and current CEMGFA (Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), with whom it met in 2023, about what it perceives to be an excessive rotation of the CISMIL

leadership, jeopardising the hierarchical stability of this military operations support body.

In 2023, in addition to analysing the documents received and other contacts, the CFSIRP carried out 4 (four) inspection visits to the CISMIL.

The visits were carried out without a predetermined agenda, with the CFSIRP analysing files, reports and various documents requested at random, according to criteria it had previously defined.

In 2023, as observed by the CFSIRP, the CISMIL acted within the priorities determined by higher authorities and in compliance with the legal framework governing its action.

The CFSIRP encountered no difficulties in monitoring and supervising the CISMIL, accessing the information requested and obtaining all the clarifications required.

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3.5. Liaison with the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission

In accordance with the provisions of Articles 26 and 27 of the SIRP Framework Law, the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission has the exclusive competence to supervise the activity of the SIED Data Centre and the SIS Data Centre (which report to the Secretary-General of the SIRP), and must report to the CFSIRP any irregularities or violations it detects in the exercise of its function. However, the CFSIRP is responsible for overseeing other information contained in other Intelligence Services media.

During 2023, the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission maintained several contacts, seeking to collaborate in the task of ensuring that the Intelligence Services operate globally in compliance with the Constitution and the law. In particular, the CFSIRP and the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission have shared opinions and met twice.

In 2023, the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission did not report to the CFSIRP any irregularities in the operation of the SIED Data Centre and the SIS Data Centre, nor in the processing of data by the Intelligence Services.

3.6 Complaints/communications submitted to the CFSIRP

Under the terms of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the SIRP Framework Law, the CFSIRP analyses complaints or communications that citizens send to it regarding the Intelligence Services, giving them due attention and taking all necessary steps to fully clarify the issues raised.

In 2023, the CFSIRP received two communications, relating to the SIS's actions within the scope of the Immigration and Borders Service (SEF)'s procedures for granting residence permit for investment activities (ARI), known as 'Golden Visa'. After obtaining all the information necessary to analyse these cases, the CFSIRP concluded that there had been no illegal action by the SIS, including any action undermining rights, freedoms and guarantees, and the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission came to the same conclusion. The CFSIRP was also aware of the response from the SIRP's Data Oversight Commission regarding two other communications addressed to it, in which it also concluded that there had been no violation of Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees.

3.7 Issuing opinions/reports and monitoring legislative activity

In 2023, at the request of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees, the CFSIRP issued two opinions on the following draft laws, according to Article 9, paragraph 2(l) of the Framework Law on the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (Law no. 30/84 of 5 September, last amended by Organic Law no. 4/2014 of 13 August):

- Bill no. 798/XV/1 of the IL (Liberal Initiative Party) (removes 'Airsoft' devices from the Weapons Act).
- Bill no. 835/XV/1.^a of the PAN (Party of People-Animals-Nature) - Reinforces the SIRP's powers of parliamentary oversight and creates a system of incompatibilities applicable to members of the Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (CFSIRP), amending Law no. 30/84 of 5 September.

On its own initiative, and under the terms of Article 9, paragraph 2(l) of the Framework Law on the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic, the CFSIRP also issued an opinion on Draft Organic Law no. 791/XV/1.^a (PCP) - Amends the parliamentary oversight regime of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (sixth amendment to Law no. 30/84 of 5 September).

The CFSIRP also issued an opinion on the diplomas relating to the revision of the SIRP's special careers, noting with satisfaction that they respond to the concerns already expressed in its Reports for 2022 and the first half of 2023.

The CFSIRP has also followed the constitutional revision initiatives to safeguard the constitutionality of access to telecommunications and internet data, taking into account Constitutional Court Ruling no. 464/2019 of 18 September, which declared the unconstitutionality, with general binding force, of Articles 3 and 4 of Organic Law no. 4/2017 of 25 August, in which that allows intelligence officers from the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED) access to basic and equipment location data, as well as traffic data, for the purposes of producing information necessary to safeguard

national defence and internal security. On the other hand, upstream, it also monitors legislative initiatives on the obligation for service operators to retain telecommunications data, which is a prerequisite for such access, taking into account Constitutional Court Rulings no. 268/2022 of 19 April and no. 800/2023 of 4 December 2023, as well as European case law on the subject, in particular the EU Court of Justice Ruling of 20 September 2022 (Joined Cases C-793/19 and C-794/19).

In fact, the Intelligence Services' access (subject, of course, to restrictions and controls) to electronic communications metadata (which is not to be confused with communications content) is a key tool for the timely detection of threats in certain areas of national security, as well as being an important element in deepening international cooperation with similar partner services, enabling them to guarantee greater reciprocity. Hence the importance of pursuing, in compliance with the Constitution, legislative initiatives that seek to achieve the same objectives as Organic Law no. 4/2017 of 25 August, closing an unparalleled gap at European level, since the threats that intelligence services aim to detect and prevent have neither diminished nor disappeared.

The CFSIRP believes that there is a great need to provide the Intelligence Services with the resources to detect, anticipate and prevent threats such as terrorism, violent extremism, cybercrime, espionage, organised crime and others, while fully respecting the rights, freedoms and guarantees and all the constitutional and legal limits on their actions, similar to the resources available to counterpart services in countries that respect all the requirements of the democratic State based on the Rule of Law, with which the Portuguese services must cooperate. These resources (which the Portuguese intelligence services do not have) would make it possible to deepen cooperation in the exchange of information with counterpart services in partner States and within multilateral fora (such as the Club de Bern, the Intelligence and Situation Centre - INTCEN or the Civilian Intelligence Committee of NATO), which is largely based on the logic of reciprocity.

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3.8. Other activities

In 2023, the CFSIRP attended the parliamentary hearing, jointly held by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees and the National Defence Committee to present and discuss the Council's Report for 2022.

The CFSIRP also participated in two hearings of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees regarding the SIS's actions in the episode involving the compromise of classified documents contained in a laptop computer taken by an assistant from the Ministry of Infrastructure, within the context of his competence of research and assessment of risks or threats to the national interest posed by the compromise of classified State information.

On 14 March 2023, the CFSIRP took part in a meeting organised by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA): '*National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies*'. The meeting was attended by representatives of the independent external supervisory authorities of the Intelligence Services of the EU Member States. With the exception of Portugal, all EU Member States' Intelligence Services have access to specific communications surveillance measures (metadata and wiretapping), though subject to *ex ante* and *ex post* control.

On 9 and 10 November 2023, the CFSIRP attended the European Intelligence Oversight Conference 2023 (EIOC 2023), held in Oslo.

The CFSIRP also took part in the ceremonies celebrating the 38th anniversary of the SIS and the 28th anniversary of the SIED.


4. Overall assessment and suggestions

In the areas in which they operate (internal and external security, military security), the Intelligence Services have the irreplaceable task of detecting, as early as possible, various threats, such as terrorism, organised crime, espionage, cybercrime, cyberthreats, sabotage, subversion, violent extremism, radicalism that destabilises social cohesion, organised insurrection movements, among others, including hybrid and diffuse ones. These are threats with a high potential for damaging the democratic State based on the Rule of Law and society in general, so it is essential to be aware of them and prevent them from being materialised.

The production of high quality information and the fulfilment of the Intelligence Services' important mission implies not only their effective functioning, but also internal cooperation (between the Intelligence Services and with the competent authorities responsible for police action and criminal investigation) and international cooperation (with counterparts in partner countries or at multilateral level), which must and can be intensified.

Given the resources available, the Intelligence Services have made a remarkable effort to produce quality information, which is a crucial element in detecting, assessing and preventing threats to national security or those that jeopardise society and the democratic State based on the Rule of Law itself. It should be noted that the tasks of researching, processing and disseminating the information needed to preserve security (internal and external), national independence and interests, the unity and integrity of the democratic State based on the Rule of Law and social cohesion and peace, require an operational activity of collecting, processing and analysing relevant information, with a high degree of quality and professionalism.

During 2023, the CFSIRP found that, in general terms, the Intelligence Services carried out their mission efficiently and in accordance with the priorities determined by higher authorities, globally respecting the Constitution and the law.



Taking into account the regulatory framework that limits the work of the Portuguese Intelligence Services and the national availability of material and technological resources, this performance is due, to a large extent, to the dedication, commitment, spirit of mission and competence of the human resources, whose work of researching, processing, analysing and disseminating information is generally guided by high ethical standards.

This human capacity for analysing and processing information is largely responsible for the prestige that the Portuguese Intelligence Services have earned among their partners in the field of international cooperation, the relevance of which is crucial to countering the current threats, which are predominantly transnational, complex and hybrid in nature.

Therefore, since it is essential for the Intelligence Services to perform well that they have sufficient human resources who are competent, motivated and ethically exemplary, it is necessary to continue the efforts made in 2022 in terms of recruitment and training. On the other hand, all this effort will be in vain if the Intelligence Services are unable to retain their most talented human resources. This is why the CFSIRP is delighted that its concern about the review of these special careers has been met, and now hopes that their greater attractiveness will help increase the capacity to recruit and retain the human resources that are essential to the work of the Intelligence Services.

However, the CFSIRP warns of the urgent need to guarantee the annual recruitment of human resources in order to at least make up for the shortfall resulting from a significant number of officials retiring. It therefore suggests that the competent authorities pay special attention to this issue, which is essential for ensuring that the Intelligence Services are operational.

The CFSIRP has also warned of the need to equip the Intelligence Services with the technological means and instruments that will enable them to perform well in the Digital Age. Nowadays, OSINT is increasingly central to the production of

quality information, so it is important to equip the Intelligence Services with modern technological systems that allow them to obtain intelligence from publicly available information and manage relevant knowledge to anticipate and prevent threats to national security and the democratic State based on the Rule of Law, always with scrupulous respect for the Constitution, the law and citizens' Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees.

Lisbon, 23rd April 2024


The Council for the Oversight of the
Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic



Constança Urbano de Sousa



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